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Abstract   To ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling 
fish stocks, the 1995 United Nations Fish Stock Agreement calls for the establishment 
of regional fisheries management organizations to manage them. This article stud-
ies the potential for cooperation in straddling stock fisheries when the cooperative 
coalition of countries acts as a Stackelberg leader against the remaining singleton 
countries. Within the Stackelberg fishing game with several interested parties, the 
result shows that an increase in the cooperation level leads to an increase not only in 
the steady-state fish stock, but also in the total rent of the fishery. Further, the outlook 
for cooperation is better within the Stackelberg game, where the cooperative coalition 
acts as a leader, than in the Cournot game. At the stable equilibrium of a Stackelberg 
game, not only is the steady-state fish stock higher, but also the total resource rent, 
participants’ rent, and non-participants’ rent are higher than those of the Cournot-
Nash stable equilibrium. The new-entrant issue is a problem for the conservation of 
fish stock in the Stackelberg game. Self-financed transfers with commitments of the 
initial stable coalition will increase the level of cooperation. The theoretical findings 
are illustrated by a numerical example of how to reach stable full cooperation and 








declared that the effective management of these resources represents one of the great 
challenges	to	achieving	sustainable	fisheries.	This	article	focuses	on	shared	resources	
with several interested parties. The management of the marine resources in the South Chi-
na Sea (SCS), where the resources are harvested by about 10 countries, is one example to 
which	this	analysis	may	be	most	relevant.	The	North-East	Atlantic	(NEA),	fished	by	even	Long and Flaaten 120
more countries, is another example.1 In both cases, several migratory species are season-
ally	more	or	less	available	for	fishermen	in	different	locations	and	countries.	There	is,	
however, one important difference between these two oceans. In the NEA case, 200 miles 
of internationally recognized exclusive economic zones (EEZs) have been established 
along	almost	all	the	coasts.	This	still	leaves	some	important	fishable	areas	in	international	
waters between two or more EEZs. In the SCS, however, few EEZs are internationally rec-




high seas where the resources are subject to exploitation by so-called distant-water states.
	 The	exploitation	of	a	fish	stock	shared	by	a	limited	number	of	agents	involves	strate-
gic	choices.	The	theory	of	fisheries	games	before	1993	concerned	cases	of	just	two	agents	
(see e.g., Munro (1979) for an early contribution; Kaitala (1986), Munro (1991), Sumaila 
(1999), and Lindroos, Kronbak, and Kaitala (2007) for reviews; Kaitala and Pohjola 
(1988) and Armstrong and Flaaten (1991) for applications). However, many important 




number of agents involved is greater than two. The last decade has produced literature us-




possibility of sub-coalitions forming among players arises. Moreover, non-compliance 
and free-riding behaviour both add to the complexity of the problem: ‘non-compliance’ 






Conservation and Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN 
1995)—hereafter	called	the	UNFSA.	At	the	heart	of	the	UNFSA	lies	the	establishment	of	






to the UNFSA (UN 2008). Munro (2003) argued that, under the UNFSA, in the case of a 
straddling	stock,	a	state	or	entity	that	is	not	a	member	of	the	RFMO	found	to	be	fishing	
in the high seas governed by the RFMO would be deemed to be engaged not in illegal 
fishing	but	rather	in	unregulated	fishing;	thus,	he	claimed	that	unregulated	fishing	can	be	
seen as another form of free riding. Moreover, the incidence of illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated	(IUU)	fishing	is	pervasive	in	many	parts	of	the	world	(FAO	2001).	Lodge	




distant-water nations may appear.Potential for Cooperation in Straddling Stock Fisheries 121
  For the reasons discussed above, it is important for the understanding of RFMO 
management	of	a	straddling	fish	stock	that	this	fishery	is	modelled	with	the	equilibrium	
concept of a self-enforcing or stable agreement. A stable agreement made between par-
ties,	to	our	best	knowledge	first	proposed	by	D’Aspremont	et al. (1983) and later coined 
by	Barrett	(1994,	2003)	for	use	in	his	analysis	of	international	environmental	agreements	
(IEAs),	is	defined	as	a	single	coalition	from	which	no	member	wishes	to	withdraw	(the	
cooperative coalition is internally stable) and no non-member wishes to join (the coop-
erative coalition is externally stable). For the purposes of the analyses of RFMOs, both 
cooperative and non-cooperative game theory is needed.
  To use the non-cooperative approach for examining the potential cooperation in uti-
lizing	a	straddling	fish	stock	under	the	legal	framework	of	the	LOS	and	the	UNFSA,	this	
article considers a single coalition (formed by participants of the RFMO) through which 
members coordinate their strategies and assume that all non-participant countries behave 
as singletons. Finus (2001) demonstrated that the Cournot and Stackelberg games are two 
extreme modes of the game between the cooperative coalition and the remaining single-
tons. The Cournot game is a model in which the cooperative coalition and the singletons 
simultaneously maximize their payoffs, taking the effort levels of the others as given. In 
the	Stackelberg	game,	the	cooperative	coalition	takes	into	account	its	ability	to	influence	
the	singletons’	output	by	choosing	its	own	fishing	effort	with	endogenous	effort	levels	of	
the singletons. This means that the cooperative coalition acts as a leader of the game, or it 
has a strategic advantage. 
	 The	literature	examining	the	cooperative	and	non-cooperative	consequences	of	a	
shared	fishery	by	Cournot	and	Stackelberg	games	adopts	both	dynamic	and	static	ap-
proaches. Levhari and Mirman (1980) compared results of the two games in the case of 
two	countries	and	two	periods.	Benchekroun	and	Long	(2002)	argued	that	migratory	fish	
that	travel	along	the	coastline	of	several	nations	are	subject	to	sequential	fishing	and	ap-
plied a Stackelberg game for a differential game of two agents. Naito and Polasky (1997) 
also employed the Stackelberg assumption with a two-period dynamic game model to 
investigate	the	leading	role	of	a	coastal	country	in	utilizing	a	migratory	fish	stock	when	
distant-water	fishing	nations	are	assumed	to	act	as	singletons.	Hannesson	(1997)	used	
repeated games, with a Cournot assumption in the punishment period, to study factors 
affecting	the	stable	grand	coalition	of	a	shared	fishery.	In	contrast,	Mesterton-Gibbons	
(1993)	was	the	first	to	provide	analysis	of	static	non-cooperative	fisheries	games	with	a	
Cournot assumption. Ruseski (1998) adopted the static approach in a Cournot game in the 
case	of	two	agents	to	examine	the	consequences	of	direct	fishing	subsidies	on	a	shared	
fishery.	Kronbak	and	Lindroos	(2006)	also	employed	the	static	game	to	examine	fisher-
men and authorities forming coalitions. Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2008) used the static 
approach	with	a	Cournot	assumption	of	choosing	fishing	effort	among	coalitions	to	exam-
ine the cooperative coalition formation when there are two or more countries involved in 
straddling	stock	fisheries.	Long	(2009)	adopted	the	same	method	used	by	Pintassilgo	and	
Lindroos	(2008)	to	examine	the	potential	of	cooperation	in	straddling	stock	fisheries	if	an	
RFMO forms with an endogenous minimum participation level. Pintassilgo et al. (2010) 
extend the analysis of Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2008) by consideration of the asymmetry 
of harvesting costs. Kaitala and Lindroos (2007) argued that the advantage of static over 
dynamic games is that analytical results are easier to derive and interpret. In addition, 
since the static approach provides a good long-term prediction, it is consistent with the 
UNFSA’s	aim	of	establishing	an	RFMO	to	sustain	the	long-term	stability	of	shared	fish	
stocks (Long 2009). 
	 To	ensure	the	long-term	conservation	and	sustainable	use	of	straddling	fish	stocks,	
the	UNFSA	calls	for	the	establishment	of	RFMOs	to	manage	these	marine	fish	stocks.	
Using the static Cournot game combined with the classical Gordon-Schaefer model for 
homogenous	fishing	countries,	Pintassilgo	and	Lindroos	(2008)	have,	however,	dem-




stable and successful. Pintassilgo et al. (2010) have shown that the success of RFMOs 
is related to the level and asymmetry of harvesting costs in the static Cournot game. To 
investigate	the	potential	for	cooperation	in	straddling	stock	fisheries,	this	article	assumes	
that	an	RFMO	for	managing	a	straddling	stock	fishery	is	sophisticated	and	acts	as	a	
Stackelberg leader, and that the singletons are naïve and act as the Stackelberg followers.2 
Hence, a Stackelberg game, the other extreme mode of the game between the cooperative 
coalition and the remaining singletons, is adopted in this study. Clearly, a comparison of 
this model and the one generated by a Cournot game may provide some important in-
sights for policymakers.
  This analytic approach has a much longer tradition in the literature on IEAs (e.g., 
Barrett	1994;	Finus	2003).	Essentially,	this	literature	focuses	on	emission	reductions,	and	
hence the provision of a public good (Pintassilgo et al. 2010). We, however, analyze the 
management	of	a	common	pool	renewable	resource—straddling	stock	fisheries	under	the	
UNFSA—with	emphasis	on	the	steady-state	fish	stock.
  This article uses a static Stackelberg game combined with the classical Gordon-
Schaefer	model	to	examine	the	potential	of	cooperation	in	utilizing	a	straddling	fish	stock.	
The	findings	are	also	compared	with	the	alternative	mode	of	the	strategic	interaction,	the	
Cournot game, shown in Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2008) and Long (2009). In this study, 
we show that i) an increase in the level of cooperation leads to an increase not only in the 
steady-state	fish	stock,	but	also	in	the	total	resource	rent	of	the	fishery;	ii) the outlook for 
cooperation is better within the Stackelberg game, where the coalition acts as a leader, 





tion will increase the level of stable cooperation.
  The article is organized as follows. The next section presents the game and examines 
the	potential	of	cooperation	in	straddling	stock	fisheries.	A	numerical	example	and	a	dis-
cussion of how to reach a full cooperation will follow. Finally, the last section discusses 
policy implications and conclusions. 
Model and Analysis
We assume that N	countries	exploit	a	straddling	fish	stock, { } N C ,..., 1 = . The harvest 
function,	with	equal	catchability	coefficient	q, is the same across countries. Suppose 
that	each	country	uses	fishing	effort	 C i ei ∈ ≥     , 0 . For simplicity, the classic Gordon-






2 This problem setting may be relevant in cases when a single coalition, that includes participants of the RFMO, 
has	more	information	about	the	shared	fish	stock	than	each	singleton.Potential for Cooperation in Straddling Stock Fisheries 123
where G is the population renewal function and H is harvesting summed across all the 
countries. We assume that, 
1 1
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       where G is the logis-
tic growth function, hi is the harvest of player i, K	is	the	carrying	capacity	for	a	fish	stock, 
and r	is	the	intrinsic	growth	rate.	The	steady-state	relation	between	fishing	effort	and	
stock growth is given by G(x) = H, or: 
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  We assume a linear cost function for each country. To be comparable with Pintassilgo 
and	Lindroos	(2008)	and	Long	(2009),	the	unit	price	of	fish,	p, and unit effort cost, c, are 
assumed	to	be	constant	and	equal	for	every	country.	Therefore,	the	welfare	of	country	i, 
πi,	resource	rent,	the	difference	between	revenue,	and	cost	of	fishing	are	given	as:
                                                           πi = pqeix – cei.                                                    (2)
To	proceed,	assume	that	when	a	cooperative	coalition	is	established,	it—under	the	UNF-
SA—allows	any	of	the	N players to choose either to be a member or a non-member of the 
cooperative coalition. In addition, assume that the coalition’s participants fully comply 
with the terms of agreement. Next, suppose that  [ ] N N N N s / ) 1 ( ,..., / 3 , / 2 − ∈  is the 
fraction	of	countries	that	join	the	cooperative	coalition—hereafter	called	the	cooperation	
level. Ns, an integer, is the number of countries that form a coalition, while N(1–s) is the 
number of singletons that stay outside the cooperative coalition. Thus, the cooperative 
coalition includes at least two agents. The partial cooperative case deals with a coopera-
tion level in the range from 2/N to (N – 1)/N.	The	total	fishing	effort	of	the	cooperative	
coalition is Ep, while each participant of the cooperative coalition uses ep, such that Ep = 
Nsep. Each non-participant (singleton) uses enp,	yielding	a	total	fishing	effort	level	of	all	
the singletons Enp= N(1–s)enp.	The	total	fishing	effort	of	the	fishery	is	E = Ep + Enp.
  Stackelberg leadership of the cooperative coalition assumes that, when choosing its co-
operative	fishing	effort,	the	cooperative	coalition	will	take	the	reaction	of	the	singletons	into	
account	(Finus	2001).	This	means	that	the	cooperative	coalition	chooses	its	fishing	effort	
with endogenous effort levels of singletons (e.g.,	Barrett	1994).	In	other	words,	the	coop-
erative coalition acts as a leader of the game, or it has a strategic advantage (Finus 2001).
  To be comparable with Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2008) and Long (2009), assume 
that	each	singleton	chooses	its	fishing	effort	to	maximize	its	resource	rent,	taking	the	fish-
ing effort levels of the remaining singletons and the cooperative coalition as given:
                






Max             π pqe x-ce   
subject to:
  (1 ) 1 (1 / ), np np p qx e N s e E rx x K                                     (3)
where   and  np p e E 	are	the	fishing	effort	of	each	remaining	singleton	and	the	cooperative	
coalition,	respectively,	and	are	given.	Next,	the	cooperative	coalition	chooses	its	fishing	
effort level by maximizing the collective rent while taking into account the behaviour of Long and Flaaten 124









P pqE x cE    ,                
subject to:
(1 ) (1 / ) np p xq N s e E rx x K   − + = −   .																																	(4)
At	equilibrium,	 np e  = enp and




































= =  is the normalized coefficient and
∞ x is the actual open-
access	equilibrium	stock	level,	respectively.	We	exclude	the	cases	b  =  0  for 
costless harvesting and b = 1, which would imply stock extinction and no commer-
cial harvesting. Therefore, 0 < b < 1. Furthermore, the corresponding steady-state 
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  Full cooperation exists when s = 1, in which case (3) is meaningless. The fully coop-
erative solution is given (Long 2009):
         
                   
2 2 (1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 )
(1) ; (1) ; (1) ; (1) .
2 2 4 4
r b b rpK b rpK b
e  x K                                                 π  
qN N
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Note that the fully cooperative solution is a special case of the above solutions.
  Non-cooperation occurs when no coalition exists in the Stackelberg game. Since 
non-cooperation	results	in	the	Nash-Cournot	stable	equilibrium	(Pintassilgo	and	Lindroos	
2008), we obtain (Long 2009):
     
      2 2
2 (1 ) 4 4
(0) (1); (0) (1); (0) (1); (0) (1).
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When N = 2, there are only non-cooperation or full cooperation strategies. It is easily 
verifiable	that	each	country	is	always	better	off	in	the	case	of	full	cooperation.	Therefore,	
full cooperation always exists (Long 2009). It should also be noted that at s = 1/N, there is Potential for Cooperation in Straddling Stock Fisheries 125
no coalition. Clearly, this is not the case of an RFMO. Hereafter, we assume that  2 > N  
and   

 
 ∈ 1   ,
2
N
s .   
  In the examination of coalition formation, the three following important indicators 
will	be	considered.	The	first	is	the	payoff	gap	between	a	non-participant	and	a	participant:
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The second is the incentive indicator for defecting from the cooperative coalition, as-
suming that this single defection does not cause all the other parties to the cooperative 
coalition also to defect: 
												D	=	
   
2
1 1
( 1/ ) ( ) (1).
(1 ) 1 (1 ) 2
np p π s N π s
Ns N s N s
 
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       
A non-positive defection indicator means that there will be no gain for a participant that 
leaves the existing coalition. This means that the cooperative coalition has achieved inter-
nal	stability	(D’Aspremont	et al. 1983). The third is the incentive indicator for free riding, 
which is given by:
            F = 
   
2
1 1
( ) ( 1/ ) (1).
( 1) (1 ) (1 ) 1
np p π s π s N
Ns N s N s
 
      
       
A non-negative free riding indicator means that there exists a gain, including zero, for a 
singleton if it stays outside the cooperative coalition. Thus, the cooperative coalition has 
achieved	external	stability	(D’Aspremont	et al. 1983). 
	 To	ensure	the	long-term	conservation	and	sustainable	use	of	straddling	fish	stocks,	
the UNFSA has called for and established a framework for cooperation in utilizing these 
marine	fisheries.	The	above	results	lead	to	some	bio-economic	implications	for	coopera-
tion. It is important to note that the following propositions are based on the assumptions 
of	the	stock	growth	and	catch	functions	in	equation	(1)	and	revenue	and	cost	functions	in	
equation	(2).	The	proofs	for	the	propositions	are	presented	in	Annexes	1–4.
  Proposition 1: If the level of cooperation in utilizing a straddling fish stock increas-
es,   

 
 ∈ 1   ,
2
N
s , we have ( for N > 2 and 0 < b < 1) the following implications:
  1.1 The steady-state fish stock level increases.
  1.2 The total resource rent increases.
  1.3 The rent of a non-participant increases.













s  then increases in 










s  and reaches the maximum level at full cooperation, s = 1.Long and Flaaten 126
  1.5 The income gap between a non-participant and a participant is larger than or 















< ≤ , except when 
s = 1.
  1.6 The incentive indicators for defecting and free riding are not always positive.
  The explanation behind Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 is that, when more coun-









         




game (Long 2009). In general, an increase in the level of cooperation in straddling stock 
fisheries	leads	not	only	to	higher	steady-state	fish	stock,	but	also	to	higher	total	fishing	
rent. This is a very important rationale for the call to establish a framework for the coop-
erative	use	of	straddling	stock	fisheries.
  The explanation for Proposition 1.3 is that, in the Stackelberg model, there is a stra-
tegic effect for the leader to expand harvest in order to get the follower to contract harvest 
(Naito	and	Polasky	1997).	Hence,	there	are	situations	(with	sufficiently	small	coalitions),	
where a country is better off as a member of the cooperative coalition than it is outside 
the cooperative coalition, and as the cooperative coalition grows, its members’ rent de-
teriorates. When more countries join in the cooperative coalition, each of the remaining 
singletons	will	increase	its	fishing	effort,	leading	to	an	increase	in	rent	per	non-partici-
pant.	This	is	in	line	with	the	positive	externality	in	fisheries	in	the	case	of	the	Cournot	
game proved by Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2008). 
  Proposition 1.4	can	be	justified	as	follows.	Since	there	is	a	strategic	effect	for	the	
cooperative coalition to expand harvest in order to get the singletons to contract harvest, 
if	more	countries	join	in	the	coalition,	the	participants’	fishing	effort	will	decrease.	On	the	




in the participant’s rent when there is an increase in the level of cooperation. At some de-
gree of cooperation level, as the coalition grows, the situation becomes inverted, and an 
increase in cooperation level will lead to an increase in the participants’ rent. This relation-




  Propositions 1.5 and 1.6 show that at some cooperation levels, a country will gain a 
higher resource rent when playing cooperation than when playing defect. This means that 
playing defect is not a dominant strategy in this game. As argued above, it is important 
to	find	the	stable	equilibriums	for	the	game	of	sharing	a	fish	stock.	D’Aspremont	et al. 
(1983)	set	two	requirements	for	a	stable	coalition.	First,	it	is	a	single	coalition	from	which	
no member wishes to withdraw (the cooperative coalition is internally stable). The incen-
tive	indicator,	D,	for	defecting	is	therefore	non-positive.	Second,	no	non-member	wishes	
to join the existing coalition (the cooperative coalition is externally stable). This means 
that the incentive indicator, F, for free riding is non-negative. Note that Ns is an integer. 
These lead to Proposition 2 as follows.  Potential for Cooperation in Straddling Stock Fisheries 127
  Proposition 2: A stable RFMO in a commercial straddling stock fishery (0 < b < 1)
  2.1 For a given number of countries participating, we have:
  2.1.1 Full cooperation is a stable coalition for N ≤ 4.
    2.1.2 When N > 4, a stable partial cooperation always exists at s*. Specifically, 













Moreover, the size of the stable coalition (s*) is slightly larger than that for which the re-
source rent of the participants is at its minimum.
  2.2 When N > 4, if more countries are involved in the fishery, the level of cooperation 
at stable equilibrium is reduced. There are, however, at least 50% of countries joining the 
cooperative coalition.
  The intuition behind Proposition 2.1 is that, because of a strategic effect, the leader 
expands harvest in order to get the follower to contract harvest; when the number of 
countries	involved	in	a	shared	fish	stock	is	small	enough	(four	or	fewer),	a	country	will	
recognize that it will be better off to cooperate. If, however, more countries are involved 
in	the	fishery,	an	individual	country	may	gain	more	harvest	if	it	leaves	the	cooperative	
coalition. At the level of cooperation s = s*, no country wants to join or leave the coopera-
tive coalition. In addition, Proposition 1.4 shows that the members’ rent is at its minimum 






= . Clearly, since Ns is an integer, the size of the stable 
coalition (s*) is slightly larger than that for which the rent of the participants is at its mini-
mum. Finally, the explanation for Proposition 2.2 comes directly from Proposition 2.1.2 
when N	comes	to	infinity.	
  Proposition 2 gives a more optimistic prediction for the prospects of cooperation in 
utilizing	a	straddling	fish	stock	than	the	other	extreme	case	of	the	Cournot	game	proposed	
by Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2008). They have proved that, within the Cournot game of 
choosing	fishing	effort	among	the	cooperative	coalition	and	singletons,	the	Nash-Cournot	
stable	equilibrium	is	the	non-cooperative	case	when	the	number	of	countries	involved	in	
a	shared	fish	stock,	N, is more than two. A comparison of the result of Proposition 2 and 
non-cooperation leads to the next proposition. 
  Proposition 3: At stable equilibrium in a Stackelberg game, not only is the steady-state 
fish stock higher, but also the total resource rent of the fishery, participants’ rent, and non-
participants’ rent are higher than those of the Cournot-Nash stable equilibrium when N > 2.
  Proposition 3 has an important implication for the role of an RFMO in utiliz-
ing	a	shared	fish	stock	in	two	extreme	cases.	In	the	Cournot	game,	the	RFMO	and	the	
singletons simultaneously maximize their payoffs, taking the effort levels of the others 
as given. The RFMO in the Stackelberg game, however, acts as a Stackelberg leader and 
takes	into	account	its	ability	to	influence	the	singletons’	output	by	choosing	its	own	fish-
ing effort with endogenous effort levels of the singletons. Levhari and Mirman (1980) 
also compared a Stackelberg and a Cournot model. In their duopoly model, each agent 
harvests only once per period. They demonstrated that, given the stock size, a Stackelberg 
game	yields	a	greater	equilibrium	harvest	and	a	smaller	equilibrium	steady-state	stock	
than does a Cournot game. The reason is that there is a strategic effect when the leader 
expands harvest in order to get the follower to contract harvest in a Stackelberg game 
(Naito and Polasky 1997). However, the explanation for Proposition 3’s result is that 
the strategic effect is present in our model as well, but it is dominated by the effect of 
reducing the number of singletons because of the open membership characteristic of the 
cooperative	coalition.	This	leads	to	a	higher	level	in	the	steady-state	fish	stock,	total	rent	
of	the	fishery,	and	individual	rent	in	the	Stackelberg	equilibrium	compared	with	those	in	




Steinshamn 2003; and Pintassilgo et al. 2010). A reason for this may be that the rela-
tive	costs	of	fishing	(i.e., opportunity costs) or the absolute costs of these countries have 
decreased,	making	fishing	now	profitable	(Pintassilgo	et al. 2010). Suppose some new 
players	enter	a	straddling	stock	fishery.	The	next	proposition	considers	the	effect	of	new	
entrants on the potential for cooperation when three or more countries exploit a straddling 
fish	stock	within	this	Stackelberg	game.	
  Proposition 4: The new-entrant issue
  4.1 In any cooperative coalition,
    4.1.1 if new players act as singletons, the steady-state fish stock level, the total 
rent of the fishery, and the rent per country are reduced.
  4.1.2 if new players join the cooperative coalition, the steady-state fish stock 
level and the total rent are unchanged, but the rent per coalition member is reduced.
    4.1.3 when s ≥ s*  if new players join the cooperative coalition, the rent per co-
alition member is always higher than if the new players act as singletons.
  4.2 In a stable coalition (N ≥ 4),
  4.2.1 when N = 2k, if the number of the new players is 2d+1 (2d), then d+1 
(d) new players join the RFMO and d (d) new players act as singletons (d is an integer, 
including zero). Moreover, if new players sequentially enter the fishing game, the 2d+1th 
entering player joins the cooperative coalition and the 2dth entering player acts as a 
singleton such as the first entering player joins the cooperative coalition, the second en-
tering player acts as a singleton, and so on.
    4.2.2 when N = 2k+1, if the number of the new players is 2d+1 (2d), then d 
(d) new players join the RFMO and d+1 (d) new players act as singletons. Moreover, 
if new players sequentially enter the fishing game, the 2dth entering player joins the co-
operative coalition and the 2d+1th entering player acts as a singleton such as the first 
entering player acts as a singleton, the second entering player joins the cooperative 
coalition, and so on.
  Proposition 4.1.1 suggests the negative effect of new entrants on the potential for 
cooperation if the new players act as singletons. This is consistent with Pintassilgo et al. 
(2010) in the case of the Cournot game with heterogeneous harvesting costs. The intuition 
behind Proposition 4.1.2 is that, because of a strategic effect, the cooperative coalition 
expands harvest in order to get the follower to contract harvest, and the former members 
have to share the rent with the new member(s) because of the open membership rule of 
an RFMO. Clearly, Propositions 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 demonstrate that, at any cooperation 
level	higher	than	or	equal	to	s*, the participation of new players in the existing coalition 
leads	not	only	to	higher	steady-state	fish	stock,	but	also	to	higher	total	rent	and	individual	
rent than if the new players act as singletons. This is a rationale for the open membership 
characteristic	of	the	cooperative	coalition	in	straddling	stock	fisheries.	
	 Assume	that	there	exists	a	stable	coalition	managing	a	straddling	stock	fishery.	More-
over, assume that if newcomers want to join the existing coalition, they will be accepted 
as new members, and the former members will share the rent with the new members. 
Proposition 4.2 gives an important implication for the new entrant issue. If there is only 
a	newcomer	joining	the	fishery,	it	will	participate	in	this	coalition	in	the	case	N = 2k but 
it will not in the case N = 2k+1. However, if the number of new entrants is two or more 
new players, approximately one half of them will have an incentive to act as singletons. 
This	result	shows	that	even	if	a	stable	coalition	managing	a	straddling	stock	fishery	with	
the open membership rule exists, the new-entrant issue is still a problem for the conserva-
tion	of	this	fish	stock	in	this	Stackelberg	game.Potential for Cooperation in Straddling Stock Fisheries 129
A Numerical Example and Discussion 













Next, we show that a higher level of cooperation and then full cooperation in exploiting 
a	straddling	fish	stock	may	be	reached	if	a	suitable	system	of	self-financed	transfer	with	
commitments is applied.   
  To comprehend, illustrate, and be pedagogical, a numerical example is shown in 
table 1, with parameters rpK(1–b)2 = 1000, K = 1000, (1–b)	=	0.4,	and	N = 10. Table 1 
shows that when s < 0.6, non-participants always do better by acceding to the cooperative 
coalition. On the other hand, starting at s = 1.0, participants always do better by with-
drawing from the cooperative coalition whenever s > 0.6. At s = 0.6, there is no incentive 
to defect for all the countries belonging to the cooperative coalition, and there is no in-
centive to join the cooperative coalition for all the countries outside cooperative coalition; 
the	rent	per	coalition	member	is	better	than	the	individual	rent	of	non-cooperation—the	









 Hence, a coalition consisting of six participants is 
the only stable coalition for this example. Moreover, the steady-state stock, total payoff of 
the	fishery,	and	individual	rent	at	stable	equilibrium	are	higher	than	those	of	the	Cournot-
Nash	stable	equilibrium.	Note	that	in	a	symmetric	game,	it	is	impossible	to	predict	which	
countries will join the cooperative coalition and which will not, although table 1 dem-
onstrates that a partial cooperation with at least six participants will exist, and some free 
riders (a maximum of four) will gain an attractive payoff. Thus, this game framework is 
only focused on predicting the size of a stable coalition.3
3 See Long (2009) for the further discussion of this issue.
Table 1
 A Numerical Example
s                x               πp                     πnp               Nsπp         N(1–s)πnp         ∏              G														D														F
0.0	 636.36	 –	 8.26	 –	 82.64	 82.64	 –	 –	 –5.62
0.2	 622.22	 13.88	 3.08	 27.77	 24.69	 52.46	 –10.8	 –5.62	 –7.34
0.3	 625.00	 10.42	 3.90	 31.25	 27.34	 58.59	 –6.52	 –7.34	 –5.02
0.4	 628.57	 8.92	 5.10	 35.71	 30.61	 66.32	 –3.82	 –5.02	 –3.23
0.5	 633.33	 8.33	 6.94	 41.66	 34.72	 76.38	 –1.39	 –3.23	 –1.39
0.6	 640.00	 8.33	 10.00	 50.00	 40.00	 90.00	 1.67	 –1.39	 1.08
0.7	 650.00	 8.92	 15.63	 62.5	 46.88	 109.37	 6.71	 1.08	 5.21
0.8	 666.67	 10.42	 27.77	 83.33	 55.55	 138.88	 17.35	 5.21	 13.89
0.9	 700.00	 13.88	 62.50	 125.00	 62.50	 187.50	 48.62	 13.89	 37.5





the non-participants is applied, the level of cooperation could not be improved.
  There may be various rules that can lead to the formation of larger stable coalitions. 
For	simplicity,	the	suggestion	of	Carraro	and	Siniscalco	(1993)	about	self-financed	trans-
fer with commitments is adopted to show how to increase the level of cooperation and 
then reach full cooperation, given the legal framework of the LOS and the UNFSA.
  The role of commitment to form a larger stable coalition has been discussed by Car-
raro and Siniscalco (1993). Assume that committed countries fully comply with their 
commitments. If all the countries were committed to cooperation, obviously no free rid-
ing would exist. Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) suggested that partial commitments, if 
associated with appropriate welfare transfers, can lead to larger stable coalitions. These 
tools	to	expand	the	stable	coalition	may	be	applicable	to	the	case	of	straddling	fish	stocks	
regulated by the LOS and the UNFSA.
  For ease of discussion, let us go back to the numerical example in table 1. Suppose 
that there are m countries committed to cooperation regulated by Article 8 of the UNFSA 
and that 10–m	countries	do	not	commit	to	cooperation	because	of	the	unregulated	fishing	
possibility. In order for it to be rational for committed players to pay others to expand the 
initial	coalition,	three	conditions	must	be	obtained.	The	first	is	that	the	total	transfer	to	
induce	some	non-participants	to	join	the	cooperative	coalition	must	be	less	than	or	equal	
to the gain that the m players achieve from expanding a larger coalition. Second, this 
transfer should compensate the non-participants for their loss in joining the cooperative 
coalition. Third, it should also offset incentives to defect from the new coalition (Carraro 
and Siniscalco 1993).
	 Consider	first	the	case	of	six	countries	in	a	stable	initial	coalition	committed	to	the	
cooperation in table 1. The new stable coalition at the level of eight countries will be 
reached	if	the	self-financed	transfer	is	applied,	since	the	gain	of	six	committed	countries	
(6 ×	(10.42	–	8.33)	=	12.54)	is	larger	than	the	transfer	needed	to	prevent	the	defection	
of two new countries (2 ×	(15.63	–	10.42)	=	10.42).	Also,	there	is	clearly	no	loss	for	
both new countries participating in the cooperative coalition. Moreover, it is easy to see 
that, if there are seven countries committed to cooperation, stable full cooperation will 
be reached. The reason is that the gain of seven committed countries (7 ×	(25	–	8.92)	
=	112.56)	is	larger	than	the	transfer	needed	to	prevent	the	defection	(3	×	(62.5	–	25)	=	
112.50).	Also,	there	is	clearly	no	loss	for	the	new	countries	joining	the	full	cooperation.	





when one more country joins the cooperative coalition, the gain of six committed coun-
tries (6 ×	(8.92	–	8.33)	=	3.54)	is	larger	than	the	loss	incurred	by	the	incoming	country	
(10 – 8.92 = 1.08). Suppose that the seventh country, when entering the cooperative coali-
tion, commits to cooperation. Clearly, the gain of seven committed countries (7 ×	(10.42	
–	8.92)	=	10.5)	is	larger	than	the	loss	incurred	by	the	incoming	country	(15.63	–	10.42	=	
5.21).	Hence,	the	new	stable	coalition	of	eight	countries	is	formed	by	the	self-financed	
transfer. If this procedure is repeated with the ninth country, and after that with the tenth, 
a grand coalition of full cooperation can be achieved.     Potential for Cooperation in Straddling Stock Fisheries 131
Policy Implication and Conclusion
This article uses a static approach with the classic Gordon-Schaefer model to examine the 
potential	of	cooperation	in	utilizing	a	straddling	fish	stock	when	the	cooperative	coalition	
of	countries	acts	as	a	Stackelberg	leader	in	which	the	cooperative	coalition	takes	the	fish-
ing efforts of the remaining singletons as endogenous variables. We demonstrate that an 
increase	in	the	cooperation	level	in	utilizing	a	straddling	fish	stock	leads	to	an	increase	
not	only	in	the	steady-state	fish	stock,	but	also	in	the	total	rent	of	the	fishery.	It	is	also	
found in the other extreme of a Cournot game in which the cooperative coalition and the 
singletons simultaneously maximize their payoffs, taking the effort levels of the others as 
given (Long 2009). This may be an important rationale for the establishment of RFMOs 
to	manage	straddling	stock	fisheries	under	the	UNFSA.	
  We show that the strategic advantage of the cooperative coalition in a Stackelberg 
game is a reason for the more optimistic prospects of cooperation in utilizing a strad-
dling	fish	stock	than	in	a	Cournot	game.	This	result	is	also	found	in	the	literature	on	IEAs	
for the case of transboundary pollution (e.g.,	Finus	2003).	Specifically,	we	demonstrate	





and found that the number of agents who will cooperate in setting the exploitation rate 
for	a	shared	fishery	is	quite	limited.	Pintassilgo	and	Lindroos	(2008),	however,	showed	




article demonstrates also that, when N is greater than two, the strategic advantage of the 
cooperative	coalition	leads	not	only	to	an	increase	in	the	steady-state	fish	stock,	but	also	
to higher total rent, participants’ rent, and non-participants’ rent, since it reduces the num-
ber of singletons. 
  This study shows the negative effect of new entrants on the potential for coopera-
tion if the new players act as singletons. This is consistent with Pintassilgo et al. (2010) 
in the case of a Cournot game with heterogeneous harvesting costs. Moreover, at any 
cooperation	level	higher	than	or	equal	to	its	stable	cooperation	level,	the	participation	of	
new	players	in	the	existing	coalition	leads	to	higher	steady-state	fish	stock,	total	rent,	and	
individual rent than if the new players act as singletons. This may be an important ratio-
nale for the suggestion of Lodge et al. (2007) that, in each RFMO, the members should 







est levels of total rent and participants’ rent. However, there exists an incentive for any 
participant to defect from the cooperative coalition at full cooperation when N is greater 
than four. This is also found in a Cournot game when N is greater than two (Pintassilgo 
and Lindroos 2008). According to the UNFSA, states that do not abide by the regime of 
the	RFMO	are	prohibited	from	fishing	the	straddling	fishery	resource.	The	UNFSA	is,	
however, binding only upon those states that are party to it. Some countries may refuse 
to be party to the UNFSA to gain the advantage of being free riders. This may be an ex-




(1993) is adopted as an example of using economic mechanisms to reach full cooperation 
in a Stackelberg game. Under the legal frameworks of the UNFSA and the LOS, some 
countries	have	to	commit	to	cooperation.	Using	self-financed	transfer	with	commitments,	
the goal of expanding the cooperative coalition can be reached. In the case of ten coun-
tries	sharing	a	fish	stock,	exemplified	in	table	1,	full	cooperation	can	be	reached	if	at	least	
one non-participant commits to cooperation with six countries in the stable coalition. 
Moreover, if all the countries in the initial stable coalition commit to cooperation, full co-
operation	could	be	reached	when	the	sequential	commitment	method	is	applied.	
  According to the present research, the prospects of cooperation in utilizing a straddling 
fish	stock	are	likely	if	the	cooperative	coalition	acts	as	a	leader.	Moreover,	full	cooperation	
can	also	be	reached	by	means	of	self-financed	transfer	with	commitments.	Although	this	con-
clusion is not completely novel in the wider context of environmental economics, this article 
develops	the	analysis	within	the	context	of	fisheries	economics.	The	results	bring	an	impor-
tant implication for policymakers when discussing an agreement for establishing an RFMO 
to	manage	a	straddling	fish	stock.	It	is,	however,	important	to	note	that	this	study	assumes	
that every member of the RMFO will comply with the terms of the agreement they have 
signed. This assumption means that every member will trust the compliance of others with 
the terms of agreement, with costless enforcement. If the cost of enforcing RFMO members’ 
compliance with the terms of the agreement is high enough, there may not be any incentive 
for	fishing	countries	to	establish	an	RFMO	for	managing	a	straddling	fish	stock	(Long	2009).	
This	is	probably	one	of	the	reasons	for	pervasive	over-fishing	around	the	world.	
  The results herein provide a background for discussing actual cases of sustainable 







cludes eight countries bordering the SCS such as Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the	Philippines,	Singapore,	Thailand,	and	Vietnam.	Its	objective	is	to	develop	the	fishery	
potential of the region through training, research, and information services to improve the 
food	supply	by	rational	utilization	and	development	of	the	fisheries	resources	(SEAFDEC	
2010). Thus, this may be the foundation for the formation of an RFMO. As demonstrated 
above,	and	in	other	papers	quoted,	both	the	resource	rent	and	the	steady-state	fish	stock	
may	improve	for	the	countries	committed	to	cooperation,	in	particular	if	SEAFDEC	acts	





other	areas	of	cooperation	in	the	SCS—one	of	the	most contentious areas in the world in 
terms of both maritime boundary and territorial disputes.
  Finally, following the vein of Pintassilgo et al. (2010), future studies may consider 
countries	sharing	a	fish	stock	with	a	heterogeneous	unit	effort	cost,	catchability	coef-
ficient,	and	unit	harvest	price.	Case	examination	of	more	complex	specifications	of	the	
resource rent, cost and harvest functions, and dynamic analysis may also be a natural ex-
tension of this research.  Potential for Cooperation in Straddling Stock Fisheries 133
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Annex 0. Proof of Maximization Problems
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Annex 2: Proof of Proposition 2
2.1
2.1.1 Full cooperation when
 
1








2.1.2 At s* = (N+2)/(2N) if N = 2k (k is an integer value).
Condition 1:	At	stable	equilibrium,	no	member	wants	to	leave	the	cooperative	coalition	
(internally stable). This means: 
D	=	πnp (s* – 1/N) – πp (s*)	≤	0		






  + ≤ + ⇔ N N N .	This	is	always	satisfied.
Condition 2:	At	stable	equilibrium,	no	non-member	wants	to	join	the	cooperative	coali-
tion (externally stable). This means: Potential for Cooperation in Straddling Stock Fisheries 137
F = –πp (s* + 1/N) + πnp (s*)	≥	0  
2 1 1
( 4)( 2) 2 8 0.
4 4
  N N N N         This is 
satisfied	when	N is greater than four.
  Similarly, when s* = (N+3)/(2N) if N = 2k+1.
  Finally, Proposition 1.4 also suggests that stable cooperation gives almost the lowest 
rent for the cooperative coalition’s members. 
2.2 It is easy to see that, when N	is	going	to	the	infinity,	the	stable	cooperation	level	(pre-
sented in Proposition 2.1.2) reaches half.
Annex 3: Proof of Proposition 3
When N is four or less, full cooperation exists in a Stackelberg game. Hence, Proposi-
tion 3	is	always	satisfied.	We	now	prove	Proposition 3 when N is larger than four. At s* = 
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(always	be	satisfied).
Similarly, when s* = (N+3)/(2N) if N = 2k+1.
Annex 4. Proof of Proposition 4
Denote	that:	Ns = w, the number of countries participating in a cooperative coalition; and 
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4.1.1 When w is a constant,
2 2 3 3
1 (1) 2 (1) 2 (1)
(1 ) 0; 0; 0; 0.
2( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
p np π π x n
K b
n n n w n n n n n
      
            













4.1.3 Assume that there are l new players.
At s* = (N+2)/(2N) if N = 2k, we have: w = Ns* = (N/2) +1 and n = N(1–s*) = (N/2)–1. 
Clearly, when  2
* + ≥ ⇒ ≥ n w s s . 
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This	is	always	satisfied	(Q.E.D).	
  Similarly, when s* = (N+3)/(2N) if N = 2k+1.
4.2. s* = (N+2)/(2N) if N = 2k and s* = (N+3)/(2N) if N = 2k+1 (k is an integer value).
4.2.1 When N = 2k, the cooperative coalition is stable at s* = (2k+2)/(4k). Hence, the 
number of countries participating in this stable coalition is w = Ns* = k+1. If there is an 
additional	country	joining	the	fishery,	then	the	number	of	countries	involved	in	the	fish-
ery is now 2k+1 (N1). The coalition is now stable at s1
* = (N1+3)/(2N1). The number of 
countries in the cooperative coalition is w1 = N1s1
* = (2k+4)/2 = k+2. Since w1 = w+1, 
the	first	new	player	joins	the	existing	cooperative	coalition.	Next,	assume	that	the	second	
new	player	joins	this	fishery	game.	Then,	the	number	of	countries	involved	in	the	fishery	
is 2k+2 (N2). The coalition is stable at s2
* = (N2+2)/(2N2). The number of countries in the 
stable cooperative coalition is w2 = N2s2
* = (2k+4)/2 = k+2. Since w2 = w1, the second 
new	player	acts	as	a	singleton.	Next,	assume	that	the	third	new	player	joins	this	fishery	
game.	Then,	the	number	of	countries	involved	in	the	fishery	is	2k+3 (N3). The coalition Potential for Cooperation in Straddling Stock Fisheries 139
is stable at s3
* = (N3+3)/(2N3). The number of countries in the stable cooperative coalition 
is w3 = N3s3
* = (2k+6)/2 = k+3. Since w3 = w2+1, the third new player joins the existing 
coalition. The procedure is similar for the fourth new player and so on. Hence, if there are 
2d+1 (2d)	new	players	joining	the	fishery,	d+1 (d) new players participate in the existing 
coalition, and d (d) new players act as singletons. Moreover, the new coalition is also stable. 
4.2.2 Similarly, when N = 2k+1.